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CHAPTER 15 
Labor Relations Law 
ROBERT M. SEGAL 
§15.1. Federal legislation. To the date of this writing, there has 
been no labor legislation enacted during the past year. The repeal of 
Section 14(b) of Taft-Hartley,1 which section permits states to enact 
so-called right to work clauses outlawing union security arrangements, 
has passed the House but is still pending in the Senate. The amend-
ments to the federal minimum wage law are still in Congress.2 At the 
same time, the 89th Congress has passed the labor-supported Medi-
care,s voting rights,4 education,1i and antipoverty6 bills. In addition, 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19647 became effective on July 2, 
1965, providing for equal employment opportunity8 and the new 
federal commission has been issuing regulations in this field.9 
A. U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
§15.2. Antitrust laws and labor. The problem of reconciling the 
objectives of collective bargaining and national labor policy with our 
national antitrust laws was presented to the United States Supreme 
Court in two important cases. In the first case, United Mine Workers 
v. Pennington,1 the basic issue was whether the union could enter into 
a labor contract with a multiemployer bargaining unit and as part of 
the agreement undertake to impose the same standards on other small 
coal producers irrespective of their ability to pay and even though both 
ROBERT M. SEGAL is a partner in the law firm of Segal & Flamm in Boston, Mass. 
He is cochairman of the Labor-Management Relations Committee of the Boston 
Bar Association and former chairman of the Labor Law Section of the American 
Bar Association. 
The author wishes to acknowledge the able assistance of his associate, John D. 
O'Reilly, III. 
§15.l. 161 Stat. 151, 29 U.S.C. §164(b) (1964). 
2 H.R. 10518. 
S Pub. L. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965), amending 42 U.S.C. §§301 et seq. (1964). 
4 Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965). 
Ii Pub. L. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965), amending 20 U.S.C. §§236 et seq. (1964). 
6 Pub. L. 89-117, 79 Stat. 451 (1965); Pub. L. 89-15, 79 Stat. 75 (1965); Pub. L. 89-4, 
79 Stat. 5 (1965). 
778 Stat. 253 (1965),42 U.S.C. §2000(e) (1964). 
8 This section is discussed in detail in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.1. 
9 Title 29, Labor, Chapter XIV, Part 1601 (Procedural Regulations), Part 1602 
(Records and Reports), June 20, 1965. 
§15.2. 1380 U.S. 657, 85 Sup. Ct. 1585, 1607, 14 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1965). 
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parties knew that the result would be to drive marginal producers out 
of business.2 The Court divided, with three Justices reversing the 
lower court's conviction on an evidential point but holding that the 
antitrust laws applied;3 this opinion concluded that national labor 
policy precluded the union and employers in one bargaining unit 
from bargaining about wages for other units in the industry. Three 
other judges concurred in reversing but the opinion saw the case as a 
mere reaffirmation of the Allen Bradley case,4 that a union-employer 
combination that had as its purpose the removal from the market of 
marginal producers was automatically a violation of the Sherman Act 
despite the objective of the elimination of price competition based on 
labor standards; the opinion also stated that an industry-wide agree-
ment by a union and employers setting up a wage structure beyond the 
financial ability of marginal operators to pay and made to force mar-
ginal producers out was a prima facie violation of the antitrust laws. 
Justice Goldberg and two Justices wrote a dissent from the opinions 
of the other Justices but concurred in the reversal on the evidential 
point. 
In Local No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Work-
men v. Jewel Tea CO.,5 the question was whether the union could im-
pose a collective bargaining agreement with a multiparty bargaining 
unit, restricting the hours that retail food stores could sell meat, on 
Jewel Tea Co. without violating the antitrust laws even though the 
restraint on competition was immediate and apparent. The gist of the 
complaint was that the multiparty employer unit had conspired with 
the union to restrict the sale of meat to certain hours, while the union 
was the enforcing agency. The Court held that absent a conspiracy, 
the marketing restriction was so intimately tied in with wages, hours, 
and working conditions that it fell within the protection of the na-
tionallabor policy and hence did not violate the Sherman Act; it held 
that though the restriction on marketing hours had a direct impact 
on the product market, the concern of the union was immediate and 
direct as problems of job security and working conditions of the meat 
cutters at Jewel Tea were involved. The dissent by Justices Douglas, 
Black, and Clark held that the agreement itself showed that the union 
had induced the employers to use their economic power to hurt others 
2 In this case there was the additional question how this alleged conspiracy be-
tween the union and the employers could be proved. 
3 Justice White stated that the union was liable if it joined or conspired with a 
group of employers to eliminate competitors even though the union part was to 
impose uniform wages on all the industry. This extended the Allen Bradley deci-
sion, 325 U.S. 797, 65 Sup. Ct. 1533, 89 L. Ed. 1939 (1945), to cover conspiracies to 
eliminate competition based on labor standards, although he acknowledged that a 
union could seek unilaterally to enforce a uniform wage policy, for the elimination 
of competition based on wages was not the kind of restraint the Sherman Act in-
tended to proscribe. 
4 Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No.3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 65 Sup. Ct. 1533, 
89 L. Ed. 1939 (1945). 
1\ 381 U.S. 676, 85 Sup. Ct. 1596, 1607, 14 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1965). 
2
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who wanted to sell meat after 6:00 P.M. and thus was an obvious viola-
tion of the Sherman Act. 
The opinion in both cases of Justices Goldberg, Harlan, and Stewart 
pointed out the ill-starred and checkered history of judicial interven-
tion using the antitrust laws in labor matters. It asserted that Con-
gressional policy since 1930 reflects a decision to exempt collective bar-
gaining activities about mandatory subjects of bargaining from judicial 
scrutiny under the antitrust laws and to leave abuses by unions to the 
prohibitions in various labor statutes. It also pointed out that labor 
statutes reveal that business competition based on wage competition 
is not our labor policy and Congress has approved mandatory collec-
tive bargaining in good faith about wages, hours, and conditions of 
employment. 
In the two cases, the members of the Court have drawn the battle 
lines among themselves regarding antitrust laws and collective bargain-
ing. The Court has accepted as appropriate the recognized antitrust 
principles that conspiracies can be proved solely by indirect evidence; 
juries may be able to infer conspiracies from multiemployer or pattern 
agreements imposed on marginal producers. Any discussions at the 
bargaining table about the competitive impact of wages on other em-
ployers may be valid evidence of the conspiracy, subjecting companies 
and unions to jury-determined treble damages and criminal and civil 
sanctions. "Favored nations" clauses are now illegal, as are oral union 
assurances to employers that it will not grant more favorable terms to 
other employers. 
§15.3. The Court and the NLRB. The National Labor Relations 
Board achieved mixed success in its cases before the Court during the 
past year. In two lockout cases, the Court reversed the Board. In 
American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB,l the Court reversed the Board 
and held that an employer can temporarily layoff employees solely as 
a means of bringing economic pressure to support its bargaining posi-
tion for a favorable settlement after an impasse has developed. This 
may well be the other side of the coin of NLRB v. Insurance Agents' 
Int'l Union,2 where the Court held that the Act did not make the 
Board the arbiter of the sort of economic weapons unions can use to 
pressure management into accepting bargaining demands. 
The doctrine has been well established that, to avoid the effects of 
a whiplash strike and to preserve the integrity of the employers' bar-
gaining unit, the members of a multiemployer bargaining unit may 
resort to a unit-wide lockout.s It has been equally well established 
that a strike-bound employer may hire replacements during the strike.4 
These doctrines were merged and extended by the Court this past term 
§15.3. 1380 U.S. 300, 85 Sup. Ct. 955, 13 L. Ed. 2d 855 (1965). 
2361 U.S. 477, 80 Sup. Ct. 419, 4 L. Ed. 2d 454 (1960). 
S NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 77 Sup. Ct. 643, I L. Ed. 2d 676 
(1957). 
4 NLRB v. Mackay Radio Be Television Co., 304 U.S. 333, 58 Sup. Ct. 904, 82 L. 
Ed. 1381 (1938). 
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in NLRB v. Brown,5 to allow the employers also to hire temporary 
replacements pending a whiplash strike on the rationale that, if the 
struck member is entitled to hire replacements, the other members 
who exercise their right to lockout will be prejudiced by loss of trade 
if they also may not continue operation. However, the Court went to 
great lengths to limit the right to hire replacements to cases where 
there was an absence of antiunion motivation behind the business 
decision to continue operations. Moreover, whereas the struck em-
ployer could clearly hire permanent replacements for the economic 
strikers,6 the majority opinion implicitly, and the concurring opinion 
expressly, stated that locked-out employees apparently may not be per-
manently replaced. 
In a much-awaited and -prognosticated decision of Textile Workers 
Union v. Darlington Manufacturing CO.,7 the Court determined that 
an employer may terminate his entire business for any purpose with-
out violating the Act even when the termination is based on an unwill-
ingness to comply with the NLRA's requirements that he recognize 
and bargain with a certified union. The Court held that an employer 
does not have the right to close out parts of his business if motivated 
by a purpose to "chill unionism in any of the remaining plants of the 
single employer and if the employer may reasonably have foreseen that 
such closing will likely have that effect." By way of dicta, the Court 
indicated it would apply the same rules to an employer who shuts 
down an entire plant but whose relation with other plants was of such 
a substantial nature that it could be reasonably concluded that the 
closing of one plant would have a restraining effect on the employees 
at another plant.8 
In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB,9 the Court upheld 
the NLRB's position that a company's business decision to subcontract 
maintenance work in a plant involving the replacement of employees 
in the unit with a subcontractor to do the same work is subject to the 
statutory duty to bargain collectively over job security.10 
The question of the conflict between a legitimate business reason 
and interference with concerted activities also arose in NLRB v. Bur-
IS 380 U.S. 278, 85 Sup. Ct. 980, 13 L. Ed. 2d 839 (1965). 
6 See note 4 supra. 
7380 U.S. 263, 85 Sup. Ct. 994,13 L. Ed. 2d 827 (1965). 
8 For a discussion of the problems raised in the Darlington case, see Some Com-
ments on the Right of an Employer to Go Out of Business: The Darlington Case, 
4 B.C. Ind. Be Comm. L. Rev. 581 (1963). 
9379 U.S. 203, 85 Sup. Ct. 398, 1!1 L. Ed. 2d 233 (1965). 
10 The concurring opinion stresses what it believes is the narrowness of the 
holding; it pointed out that the Court did not decide that subcontracting decisions 
are as a general matter a mandatory subject for bargaining. Under these circum-
stances, the Court's decision seems to be limited to one group of workers being 
replaced by employees in the subcontractor's unit. See such subsequent decisions 
by the NLRB as Westinghouse Electric Corp., 150 NLRB No. 136, 58 L.R.R.M. 
1257, 1965 CCH Lab. L. Rep. 9079; Fafnir Bearing Co., 151 NLRB No. 40, 58 
L.R.R.M. 1397, 1965 CCH Lab. L. Rep. 9139; and American Oil Co., 151 NLRB 
No. 45, 58 L.R.R.M. 1412, 1965 CCH Lab. L. Rep. 9149. 
4
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nup & Sims, Inc.11 While two employees were trying to organize, they 
allegedly told another employee that the union would use dynamite if 
it did not get enough members. The company discharged the two 
employees because of their alleged statements. The Court upheld the 
Board's determination of a violation of Section 8(a)(I) whatever the 
employer's motive or belief, for no managerial prerogatives were in-
volved and the Board had been entrusted with the power of surveil-
lance over the manner of soliciting union membership. In organization 
cases, the Court seems to be more inclined to defer to the Board's ex-
pertise rather than in cases where the national labor policy of collec-
tive bargaining is involved. 
Finally, in NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.p the Court 
reprimanded the Board and stated that even though it has broad dis-
cretion in determining appropriate bargaining units, "it must 'disclose 
the basis of its order' and 'give clear indicaton that it has exercised 
the discretion with which Congress has empowered it:" The Court 
upheld the First Circuit's18 refusal to enforce the Board's order for a 
single district office unit rather than the old state-wide unit rule for 
insurance companies. The Court remanded the case to the Board for 
a unit determination with extent of organization as merely one, but 
not the controlling, factor. 
In three consolidated cases14 involving the National Mediation 
Board, the Court upheld long-established practices in representation 
cases contrary to the NLRB procedures. The Court held that the 
Board's choice of a ballot for elections which did not provide a space 
for voting "no union" did not exceed its statutory authority; that an 
employer is not entitled to be a party to the proceeding where the 
NMB determines the appropriate unit; and that the NMB did not 
have to hold full-scale hearings in a nonadversary proceeding involv-
ing representation cases. 
§15.4. Pre-emption. The Court once again set aside state court 
decisions which interfere with federal law absent violence or similar 
conduct. In Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union 
1264 v. Broadcast Service of Mobile, Inc.,1 the state court took jurisdic-
tion over a broadcasting station which did not meet the NLRB's juris-
dictional standards2 and enjoined peaceful picketing and union solici-
tation of advertisers seeking to persuade them to boycott the station. 
The Court reversed, holding the station was part of a chain whose 
volume met the Board's standards and therefore state jurisdiction was 
pre-empted. 
11379 U.S. 21, 85 Sup. Ct. 171, 13 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1965). 
12380 U.S. 438, 85 Sup. Ct. 1061, 13 L. Ed. 2d 951 (1965). 
18327 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1964). 
14 Brotherhood of Railway and S.S. Clerks v. Association for the Benefit of Non-
Contract Employees, 380 U.S. 650, 85 Sup. Ct. 1192, 14 L. Ed. 2d 1113 (1965). 
§15.4. 1380 U.S. 255, 85 Sup. Ct. 876, 13 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1965). 
2 NLRB, Twenty-First Annual Report 14·15 (1956). 
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In Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddoxs the state court had upheld a 
former employee's suit under state law for severance pay allegedly due 
under a collective bargaining agreement without resorting to the 
grievance procedure. The Court reversed and held that where federal 
law applies, national labor policy requires that employees wishing to 
assert contract grievances must attempt to use the grievance procedure, 
unless the arbitration clause was not exclusive, before resorting to suits 
in state courts. 
§15.5. Internal union affairs. In several Landrum-Griffin cases, 
the Court granted unions wide latitude. In Calhoun v. Harveyl the 
Court held that federal district courts cannot enjoin the holding of 
union elections but dissidents must appeal to the Secretary of Labor 
under Title IV after exhausting union remedies after the election is 
held. The Court held that Title I protected only against discrimina-
tion in nominating and voting and had nothing to do with election 
requirements covered under Title IV of the Act. In American Federa-
tion of Musicians v. Wittstein2 the Court held that a dues increase 
could be approved by a weighed-voting system in conventions whereby 
delegates cast votes equal to their local's membership. In a 5-4 decision, 
the Court in United States v. BrownS held that the Bill of Attainder 
clause in the Constitution4 made Section 504 of the L.M.R.A. uncon-
stitutional, for it made it a crime for a member of the Communist 
Party to serve as an officer or employee of the union; the majority 
concluded that since the Act attached to a specific organization (the 
Communist Party) rather than describing activities which an organiza-
tion mayor may not engage in, Congress had usurped the judicial 
function. 1i 
B. FEDERAL COURTS IN MASSACHUSETTS 
§15.6. Federal decisions. The Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit twice ruled during the 1965 SURVEY year that the fact that dis-
charged employees participated in strikes which were arguably in 
violation of Section 8(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act 
does not deprive them of their right to seek arbitration of their dis-
charges.1 The court also affirmed its standard policies of refusing to 
S 379 U.S. 650, 85 Sup. Ct. 614, 13 L. Ed. 2d 580 (1965). 
§15.5. 1379 U.S. 134, 85 Sup. Ct. 292, 13 L. Ed. 2d 190 (1965). 
2379 U.S. 171, 85 Sup. Ct. 300, 13 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1965). 
S 381 U.S. 437, 85 Sup. Ct. 1707, 14 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1965). 
4 U.S. Const., Art. I, §9. 
Ii The Court distinguished American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 
u.s. 382, 70 Sup. Ct. 674, 94 L. Ed. 925 (1950), which had sustained the predecessor 
statute which had specifically conditioned union access to the Labor Board on the 
execution of affidavits of all union officers that they were not Communist Party 
members. 
§15.6. 1 Wright Steel &: Wire Company v. United Steelworkers of America, 346 
F.2d 928 (1st Cir. 1965); Trailways of New England v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 
34!1 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1965). The court subsequently refused to substitute its own 
6
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review matters that were not properly presented to the NLRB2 and 
of granting considerable deference to the Board's discretionary classi-
fication of a worker as a supervisor.8 
The Federal District Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled 
that the statute's allowance of concurrent jurisdiction does not prevent 
the removal of a suit arising under Section 301 of t):te Act in cases 
where no relief prohibited by Norris-LaGuardia is sought.4 The evolv-
ing rule under the Landrum-Griffin Act that a union may not avoid 
a pending suit against it by attempting to correct retroactively the 
statutory violation5 was followed by Judge Wyzanski in allowing re-
covery for damages until the time of the correction.6 
Finally, in a wide-reaching opinion, the court ruled that, in the 
absence of an arbitration clause, an individual's claim that his em-
ployer had violated their collective bargaining agreement would be 
entertained, with the court assuming an arbitrator's functions.7 
C. MASSACHUSEITS LEGISLATION 
§15.7. General labor laws. Little labor legislation of importance 
was enacted during this past SURVEY year. The state minimum wage 
law1 was amended in three respects: the minimum wage for service 
employees who regularly receive gratuities was increased by five cents 
to ninety cents per hour effective September 5, 1966, and by three 
cents to ninety-three cents the following year on September 5,1967;2 
the provisions for overtime at the rate of time and one-half f()r work 
in excess of forty hours were made applicable to parking lot atten-
dants;3 and the penalties for violations of the state minimum wage 
judgment for that of the arbitrator as to whether or not the participants in the 
Trailways strike were discharged for cause. Trailways, Inc. v. Amalgamated Transit 
Union, 353 F.2d 180 (1st Cir. 1965). See also Camden Industries Co. v. United 
Brotherhood of Carpenters, 60 L.R.R.M. 2525 (1st Cir. 1965); Sheet Metal Workers 
v. Aetna Steel Products, 246 F. Supp. 236 (D. Mass. 1965); Newton-Lowell Plastics 
Employees' Assn. v. Reiss Associates, C.A. 64-878-S (D. Mass., March 24, 1965). 
2 NLRB v. Izzi, 343 F.2d 753 (1st Cir. 1965). 
8 Vega v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 576 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied (1965); NLRB v. Cooke 
8e Jones, 339 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1964). 
4 Fitchburg Paper Co. v. MacDonald, 242 F. Supp. 502 (D. Mass. 1965). 
5 Goldberg v. Amalgamated Union, 202 F. Supp. 844, 846 (E.D.N.Y. 1962). But 
d. Wirtz v. Brunton, C.A. 64-2-E.C. (S.D. Cal. 1964). 
6 Peck v. Associated Food Distributors of New England, 237 F. Supp. 113 (D. 
Mass. 1965). 
7 Telephone Workers v. New England Tel. 8e Tel., 59 L.R.R.M. 2006 (D. Mass. 
1965). 
§15.7. 1 G.L., c. 151. 
2 Acts of 1965, c. 344. (The state minimum wage law for other employees be-
came $1.30 per hour on September 5, 1965, and goes to $1.35 on September 5, 
1966, with the proviso that these rates do not become effective for employees en-
gaged in manufacturing unless the federal minimum wage law is equal to or higher 
than these rates. Acts of 1964, c. 444.) 
8 Acts of 1965, c. 416. 
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law were clarified and strengthened to cover "kickbacks."4 The pre-
vailing wage law was amended to clarify the record-keeping and 
compliance sections to require contractors and subcontractors on 
public works to file statements relative to wages paid to employees 
within fifteen days of completion of the job.1i The "help wanted" 
advertising section of the labor laws6 was strengthened by requiring 
in the publication of offers of employment any necessity to purchase an 
article and by increasing the criminal penalties for violations.7 An ad-
visory council was created for radiation protection.8 
The antidiscrimination statute, General Laws, Chapter 151B, was 
amended to prohibit employment discrimination by employers, em-
ployment agencies, and unions based upon an individual's sex.9 
Finally and perhaps most importantly, the legislature granted collec-
tive bargaining rights to municipal employees. In the event of a disa-
greement on contract terms between the employees' exclusive repre-
sentatives and the municipality, the State Board of Conciliation is 
authorized to recommend the terms of the contract. The municipalities 
are prohibited from committing unfair labor practices, and the em-
ployees are expressly prohibited from engaging in a strike or slow-
down.10 
§15.8. Public employees. The 1958 drive to give collective bar-
gaining rights to unions representing various government employees 
again achieved some success.1 Housing authorities were authorized to 
bargain collectively and to enter into agreements with unions represent-
ing the employees, and the election provisions of the Massachusetts 
State Labor Relations Law were made applicable to these employees2 
with all the problems described in the 1964 SURVEY in this area.s 
Specific benefits were again voted for special classes of public em-
ployees. Provisions were made for a maximum 42-hour work week 
for fire fighters in cities and towns which adopt the act.4 Exemptions 
from taxes on real estate up to $8000 in assessed value were provided 
for widows of fire fighters5 and for minor children of police 
and fire fighters killed in the line of duty. The noncontributory pen-
sion rights of laborers employed prior to July 1, 1937, who are pro-
moted to supervisory positions in the same department in any city or 
town after 1937 were preserve~, subject to the acceptance of this 
4 Id., c. 335. 
5 Id., c. 417. 
6 G.L., c. 149. 
7 Acts of 1965, c. 234. 
8 Id., c. 484. 
9 Id., c. 397. 
10 Id., c. 763. 
§15.8. 11958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.4. 
2 Acts of 1965, c. 564. 
s 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.7. 
4 Acts of 1965, c. 452. 
I) Id., c. 267 (widows of policemen were already provided for in the Acts of 1964, 
c. 715). 
8
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section by each town or city.8 The state's contributory group insurance 
was extended to cover employees of the Massachusetts Parking Author-
ity.7 Finally, the payment of administrative costs charged to instru-
mentalities of the Commonwealth relative to unemployment benefits 
was eliminated.8 
§15.9. Employment security. The employment security law1 was 
amended in several areas: (I) the maximum weekly benefits were in-
creased by five dollars to fifty dollars (plus six dollars for each 
dependent) effective October 3, 1965;2 (2) the pregnancy disqualifica-
tion was clarified to permit a pregnant woman to obtain benefits 
where her leave of absence exclusive of the four weeks before and after 
childbirth is caused by a clause in the collective bargaining agree-
ment;3 and (3) a person who is receiving unemployment compensation 
benefits and becomes ill is eligible for one week of benefits even though 
he fails to register or apply for work provided there is no suitable 
work for him.4 At the same time, organized labor's principal legislative 
proposals for benefits after six weeks of a labor dispute5 and for sick-
ness disability benefits6 were again defeated. 
D. MASSACHUSETTS DECISIONS 
§15.10. Employment security. In General Electric Co. v. Director 
of the Division of Employment Security,1 unemployment benefits were 
denied to persons whose work was subcontracted out during a strike. 
By subcontracting that part of his production, the employer avoided 
a certain and substantial stoppage in the plant's production. The 
Supreme Judicial Court's opinion centered on the rationale that in 
fact when the company was prevented from having a substantial 
amount of work performed at its own plant by a strike, it was a 
"stoppage of work" within the statutory denial of benefits, irrespective 
of the employer's successful maintenance of final production. Had the 
employer chosen to maintain production by hiring replacements 
rather than by subcontracting, the claimants along with the strikers 
might have been entitled to benefits.2 Moreover, the Court indicated 
6 Acts of 1965, c. 539. 
7 Id., c. 637. 
8 Id., c. 631. 
§15.9. 1 G.L., c. 151A. 
2 Acts of 1965, c. 649. 
3 Id., c. 634. 
4 Id., c. 636. 
/I House No. 1139 (1965). 
6 House No. 1343 (1965). 
§15.l0. 1 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 965, 208 N.E.2d 234. 
2 Worcester Telegram Publishing Co. v. Director of the Division of Employment 
Security, 347 Mass. 505, 198 N.E.2d 892 (1964), discussed in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §15.5. It should be noted that the picketing continued in the Telegram case 
and that the dispute had not ended, as implied in the 1964 SURVEY analysis. Fur-
thermore, the persons are entitled to benefits as long as they were replaced regard-
less whether the dispute has ended. 
9
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that, unlike the strike replacement situation where any disqualifica-
tion ceases upon the resumption of normal production, the dis-
qualifications here would last for the duration of the subcontract.s 
The fact that in one case the replacement work is not done at the 
employer's plant apparently justified such a radically different result. 
General Electric Co. v. Director of the Division of Employment 
Security4 determined that new employees, who were not entitled to 
vacation pay when the employer shut down two weeks for vacation 
purposes but who upon completion of one year's service would be 
paid for those two weeks, were nevertheless entitled to unemployment 
compensation benefits. As the employees had a mere expectancy of 
being paid in the future, the desirability of a prompt determination 
of claims prompted the Court to allow the benefits and leave open 
for an initial administrative determination at a later time the ques-
tion of the right to retain the benefits once the vacation benefits are 
actually received or vested. 
§15.11. Statutory interpretations. In Johnson v. United States 
Steel Corp.l the Supreme Judicial Court refused to read an implied 
civil remedy into the statutory prohibition of dismissal from employ-
ment for reasons of age2 or in the weekly wage law,S for it did not 
appear by "clear implication" that such an implied remedy was 
intended by the legislature. The decision was supported by the anal-
ogous tort doctrine that a mere violation of a statute does not create 
a private course of action but is merely evidence relevant to an 
independently created cause of action. Thus, a discharge in violation 
of the statute may be relevant in an arbitration hearing where the 
grievance is that the discharge was not "for cause" and was thus in 
violation of the collective bargaining agreement. The decision is fur-
ther buttressed by the fact that the similar statutes prohibiting dis-
charges or other discrimination based on race or sex expressly provide 
a private remedy.4 On standard principles of statutory construction, 
the inclusion elsewhere of an express private remedy in this statute 
is indicative of a legislative intent to exclude such a remedy.5 
In John Bath &- Co. v. Commonwealth,6 the actions of an individual 
executive of the defendant petitioner in discharging an employee for 
refusing to work morning hours prior to jury duty was held to be 
81965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 965, 970 n.5, 208 N.E.2d 234, 238 n.5. 
41965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 781, 207 N.E.2d 289. 
§15.11. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1325, 202 N.E.2d 816, cert. denied, 59 L.R.R.M. 
2064 (1965). 
2 G.L., c. 149, §§24A-24G. 
SId. §148. 
4Id. §105A; c. 151B, §5. 
5 Retail Clerks Int. Assn. v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17,25-26, 82 Sup. Ct. 
541, 546-547, 7 L. Ed. 2d 503, 508-509 (1962); d. Rousseau v. Building Inspector of 
Framingham, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 599, 603, 206 N.E.2d 399, 402, noted in §§14.1, 
14.8, 14.17 supra. 
6 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1213, 202 N.E.2d 249. 
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within the statutory prohibitions of discharges because of jury duty.7 
The particular work requirements risked impairment of the em-
ployee's effectiveness as a juror in that the work would require bathing 
facilities for the employee to present himself properly for jury duty 
and no such facilities were in fact available. The action of the indi-
vidual officer of the corporation in firing its employee was held to be 
a contempt independent of the statutory contempt. While the Court 
left open the question of requiring work of jurors in emergency situa-
tions and where it would be plainly compatible with an employee's 
jury obligations, the practice was strongly suggested of referring the 
legality of such work assignments to the trial judge rather than, as 
was done here, assuming the risk of interference with the operation 
of the court. 
In John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Insur-
ances the Court formulated the novel doctrine that a state regulation 
which places an economic burden on a strike-bound employer is invalid 
on principles of federal pre-emption as it would give the union a potent 
economic weapon in an area which Congress left free for the operation 
of economic forces. Accordingly, a recently enacted statute9 which 
purported to prevent certain insurance policies from lapsing during 
a strike of the insurance agents was held to be invalid as the com-
pany's economic bargaining position would be crippled during a 
strike if it were deprived of its right to demand premium payments 
while continuing to pay benefits. Similar economic intrusions into 
the labor battleground are made by the state's allowance of a tax 
deduction to an employer for business losses suffered during a strike 
of his employees or by the judicial allowance, or disallowance, of an 
employer's defense of impossibility of performance to a contract claim 
based on the inability to perform during a strike. As economic effects 
far more direct have received the sanction of the Court,10 and as the 
Supreme Court of the United· States has refused to extend the pre-
emption cloak to such matters which are a peripheral concern of the 
federal regulation despite the fact that the state regulation may have 
some restriction in an area covered by the federal statute,11 it is doubt-
ful that the present decision standing alone will have a serious effect 
on the limits recognized elsewhere to the doctrine of federal pre-
emption. At the same time, in light of developments in the pre-emption 
7 G.L., c. 268, §14A. 
S 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1007, 208 N.E.2d 516, also noted in §11.3 supra. 
9 G.L., c. 175, §187F, as adopted by Acts of 1963, c. 796. 
10 See, e.g., Worcester Telegram Pub. Co. v. Director of the Division of Employ-
ment Security, 347 Mass. 505, 198 N.E.2d 892 (1964), allowing unemployment com-
pensation to certain strikers over the objection that the Commonwealth was fund-
ing the strike. 
11 San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243, 79 Sup. Ct. 
773, 778, 3 L. Ed. 2d 775, 782 (1959), noted in 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§14.5, 
14.6; 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.9. 
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area,12 the Attorney General might well have applied for a writ of 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court in this case. 
In Query v. Boston &- Maine R.R.,13 the Supreme Judicial Court 
reaffirmed the principle that grievances of employees under union 
contracts and the Railway Labor Act are governed by the union pro-
cedures and the statutory remedies under the Railroad Adjustment 
Board. 
12 In Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 258, 84 Sup. Ct. 1253, 
1257, 12 L. Ed. 2d 280, 285 (1964), the Court stated that the answer to the basic 
question of whether "incompatible doctrines of local law must give way to prin-
ciples of federal labor law" ultimately depends upon "whether the application of 
state law ... would operate to frustrate the purpose of federal legislation." In 
the Hancock case, the purpose of federal labor legislation is hardly frustrated by 
giving one side or the other some economic concessions. See also 1964 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §15.2. Moreover, the Supreme Court has subsequently rejected the dog-
matic rationale that all peaceful labor activity affecting commerce is necessarily 
beyond the regulatory or even conjunctive power of state agencies and courts. Hanna 
Mining Co. v. Marine Engineers Beneficial Assn., 60 L.R.R.M. 2473 (1965). 
131965 Mass. Adv. Sh. II, 203 N.E.2d 545. 
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